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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Make no mistake about it: This is a case about credibility. 
The district court found in both the initial and subsequent motion to suppress hearings that the 
testimony of the officers and other state witnesses were "credible," and, that Hunter's testimony was not 
"particularly credible." See: State v. Hunter, Supreme Court No 36728, T. p. 67, lines 22 through 25; 
and, p.68, lines 9-23 respectively. The Appellate Court as well recognized this point in its 2011 
Unpublished Opinion No. 519, State v. Hunter, June 16, 2011 Docket No. 36728, p. 5,, 2, noting "The 
court also found the testimony of the officers to be more credible than the testimony of Hunter." 
Hunter and his co-defendant Chase Storlie have provided more than one sworn testimony that 
the events of September 2, 2007 are not as testified to by Detective Morgan, Misty Whited, and ISP 
Trooper Sutton. Someone is lying. While there exists irrefutable evidence of just who that person or 
persons is, Hunter has been thus far gagged from obtaining or presenting it. 
RESPONDENT'S MISSTATEMENTS, MISAPPREHENSIONS 
AND/OR OMISSIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Contrary to the State's statement of facts and course of proceedings, Detective Morgan did not 
conduct the traffic stop on September 2, 2007; that stop was done by ISP Trooper Ronald Sutton, at 
Detective Morgan's radio request. (R. p. 249 ,1-2) 
2. Moreover, the initial justification for the stop was Detective Morgan's alleged observation of 
traffic violations by the appellant, not any reasonable suspicion of drug smuggling. (R. p. 249 ,1 ). It 
was only following a subsequent suppression hearing that a reasonable articulable suspicion was 
deemed to have been established by virtue of prior investigation. (State v. Hunter No. 36728 - T. p. 
142-43 lines 4-25, and 1.) And, even than the district court did does accord the previous investigation 
as particularly "helpful or germane" to the stop of the vehicle. See: State v. Hunter, Supreme Court No 
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36728, T. p. 68, lines 17 through 20 in this regard. 
3. The State's Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings contains a serious omission of 
critical material facts when it fails to mention that a motion to proceed pro se with an accompanying 
I..R.C.P. 59(e) and attachments, were filed with and ruled on by a newly assigned district judge prior to 
appeal. The importance of this omission can not be understated and will be discussed at some length 
within the following Factual and Legal Rebuttal section of this reply. 
FACTUAL AND LEGAL REBUTTAL 
A. The State's argument that Hunter's claim for specific discovery 1s neither preserved nor 
meritorius rests on a bed of sand, and, the case law used to support that proposition is inapposite. 
Subsequent to the district court's February 26, 2014 order granting summary judgment, Hunter 
filed a Motion to Proceed Pro Se, and a timely I.R.C.P 59(e) Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment, 
with appendices, attachments (Docket No. 41992, Clk's R. 399-429*) and a motion for a telephonic 
hearing. * Judicial notice is requested of the fact that these documents were sequenced out of order by 
the Reporter and it will require a certain effort to track the motions, attending affidavits, and 
memorandums in support, since the record lacks an index. 
A newly assigned judge erroneously viewed these same filings in contradiction to the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent February 12, 2015 ruling on finality of judgments,** under the auspices of 
I.R.C.P ll(a)(2)(B) (Docket No. 41992, Clk's R. 446) rather than I.R.C.P 59(e); and, denied that 
motion, as well as Hunter's Renewed Motion for Specific Discovery on March 31, 2014. (Docket No. 
41992, Clk's R.44 7) * * See: Appendix "A" attached hereto and incorporated hereby. 
Although there is no specific ruling on the Hunter's motion to proceed pro se, the district court 
ruled on the accompanying motions; and, accordingly, it is an a fortiori that Hunter was legally entitled 
to move forward as a pro se litigant from that point on. Despite these facts, this same judge ordered the 
previously court appointed counsel to "remain as local counsel to represent the petitioner in all regards 
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in proceedings before the First District Court." (Docket No. 41992, Clk's R. 441). 
Subsequently, Hunter filed an original jurisdiction Petition for Writ of Mandate, which was 
summarily denied, in this same regard. See: Hunter v. Hon. Jav Gaskill, Idaho Supreme Court Docket 
No. 42649-2014. A copy of those filings and supportive documents was attached to Hunter's initial 
briet: and are hereby incorporated herein in their respective entireties as well. 
The foregoing events and rulings, or lack thereof, constitute abuse of discretion by the district 
court contradict the State's arguments that Hunter's first issue is not preserved for appeal, and preclude 
the state from rephrasing this issue as it has done on page three (3) of the Brief of Respondent, for 
those reasons following: 
Hunter properly filed and noticed up for a telephonic hearing a motion to so proceed, along with 
a Rule 59(e) motion to alter and amend, a motion for judicial notice, and a motion to renew his original 
motion for specific discovery. (Docket No. 41992, Clk's R. 399-429) See as well, Appendix "B" of the 
initial brief for a more detailed discussion of the facts. 
The district court chose to rule on two of the motions and simply leave the underlying motion to 
proceed pro se and for a telephonic hearing absent any formal ruling. No matter how well intended that 
decision was it ignores the rules governing motion practice, Hunter's right to take control of his own 
proceedings, due process and leaves several unanswered questions of law. 
Defendants in the State of Idaho have a right to represent themselves under the current state of 
the law. See: State v. Hoppe,_ Idaho_, Docket No. 30302, March 25, 2004 Idaho Supreme Court 
Opinion No. 30; and, State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885-86 (Ct. App. 2006), as well as the instant 
matter in these regards. 
The corner stone of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371,378 (1971); Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568,573 (1990). 
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The district court's decisions in these regards violates both of these doctrines of law, as well as 
established motion practice within the state. As such it falls within the parameters of what constitutes 
an abuse of discretion, and is reason enough to remand these proceedings to the district court for 
appropriate relief. 
B. In so far as the State's claims that Hunter's request for specific discovery are without merit, even 
if preserved, are concerned: Hunter respectfully proffers those arguments are misguided: 
1. First, although the State is correct in its contention that the assessment of credibility are the 
province of the district court, State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 
Idaho 552, 555 (Ct. App. 1999) that application can not go unbridled here, since neither district court 
judge ruling in these matters was the trial court; and, accordingly they do not enjoy that same latitude 
of unverified discretion based upon previous direct observation of the witnesses in the assignment of 
credibility. See: Argive v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 688 (Ct.App. 1984). Furthermore, "summary judgment 
is not a proper remedy where the credibility of a party is at question and untested by the trier of fact. 
State v. Tamez, 116 Idaho 945 (Ct. App.1989), citing Argive v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 688 (Ct. App. 
1984). The record reflects that Hunter never received any of these considerations in the district court. 
C. James Siebe provided sworn testimony at his deposition on that he filed a Rule 16 for 
discovery, the record proves he did not. Accordingly, counsel waived his client's rights to contest the 
prosecutors failure to produce discovery in that proceeding as well as any subsequent proceeding on 
those same grounds. See: I.C.R. 16(e)(l) in this regard. Moreover, counsel's reliance upon the 
prosecutor's response to his repeated requests for the audio-video, that "she's already given discovery to 
Peter Jones," combined with his failure to ask the officer about the audio video during the suppression 
hearing or to file a motion to compel (Docket No. 41992 Clk's R. 337, p. 12 line 15 through p. 14 line 
15) is substandard performance in anyone's handbook. 
Once again, however, the district court ignored these facts absent any hearing. 
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D. Someone isn't listening. Hunter pointed out specifically where in the transcripts the inferences 
that a GPS was being utilized in his initial brief on this appeal. See Supreme Court Docket 36728-2009, 
March 20, 2009 Suppression Hearing T., page 24, lines 7 through 19: "I believe I had surveillance units 
in the rental car." inter alia. Also see: Petitioner-Appellant's Initial Brief page 11, paragraph 6; and 
(Docket No. 41992 Clk's R. 406-408) in general. 
Hunter's brief and supporting record are sufficient to demonstrate a legitimate need for 
discovery and an evidentiary hearing despite the State's response. 
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